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Abstract 
 This independent study project will explore the relationship between EU energy 
policies and support for nationalist political parties within Europe. Based on the literature, 
I expect to see a positive relationship between perceived unjust EU energy policies and 
support for nationalist political parties. After a quantitative statistical analysis and a 
qualitative content analysis, I find that my hypothesis is neither fully supported nor fully 
unsupported.  Though a statistically significant relationship does not exist among all 
European countries, a statistically significant relationship does appear to exist among 
Eastern European countries. This has important implications for interstate energy policies, 
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Throughout history, various states, nations, and groups of people have worked to 
secure political sovereignty, personal liberties, and achieve greater recognition within 
larger multinational states and the global community. These movements, which have 
often been classified as nationalist in nature, have shaped global conflicts and led to the 
creation of new structures of power and systems of government. Though nationalist 
movements are often considered an archaic global phenomenon, many of these nationalist 
movements remain strong and influential in dictating world politics. For example, the 
Scottish Nationalist Party currently holds a majority in the Scottish Parliament and 
nationalist parties have gained increasing amounts of support in recent elections 
throughout Europe. In addition, the recent violence in Kiev, Ukraine suggests that the 
idea of regional controls and authorities, in this case, the idea of Russian influence over 
Ukrainian politics, remain extremely contentious and controversial (Saeed et all 2014). 
Furthermore, these nationalist movements inherently contradict regional integration, a 
more recent global development which is evident through the unification of various states 
into the European Union. Therefore, determining causes of nationalist party support 
would provide further insights regarding the sustainability of regional integration and 
potentially assist governments of various states and global organizations to design and 
implement policy that would help ensure stability.                                            
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Scholars have long debated the roles that various central power structures have 
assumed in fostering an atmosphere that can lead to nationalist sentiments and 
movements. This idea and model of a central governing authority was recently adapted to 
the European Union, a group of twenty-seven states who have united to better secure the 
well being of Europe.               
However, increased nationalism in Europe has prompted some to consider the role 
of the European Union in fostering an environment that promotes nationalism through 
various policies. Determining a possible linkage between various policies of the EU and 
support for nationalist political parties is worthy of examination and exploration. Though 
a variety of issue areas could be examined, this study will examine the role of energy 
policy in contributing to nationalist party support for a variety of reasons. For example, 
some of the most well known European Union policies relate to climate change and the 
reduction of energy usage. The increased emphasis on energy efficiency, as evidenced by 
the recent goals of the EU to reduce emissions by 20 percent from 1990 levels (European 
Commission: Climate 2013), suggests that energy policies are a central focus of 
European Union policy structures. In addition, in a world in which the finite resources of 
fossil fuels and land are quickly being consumed, understanding how more regional 
energy policies may impact nationalist sentiment is crucial in determining future resource 
relationships between states. Understanding the attitudes of populations regarding 
centralized resource and energy policy may assist nations and states in developing just 
and fair policies. Finally, given that national sovereignty would need to be compromised 
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within interstate energy agreements, determining possible linkages between these policies 
and nationalist party support can provide insights into the role of energy within politics. 	  
Therefore, in this paper, the hypothesis, that perceived unjust European Union 
energy policies lead to an increase in support for nationalist political parties will be 
researched through the utilization of statistical and content analysis. Results of this study 
will provide insights into the rise of nationalist party support, help determine how 
regional and interstate energy policies are viewed, and provide evidence to draw 
conclusions about the idea that energy policy is a driving force of nationalist party 
support. Furthermore, findings of this study may be applicable to other regions of the 
world considering the adoption of regional energy policies. 	  
This study will consist of four major sections inclusive of the Literature Review 
and Theory Section, the Methodology section, the Data section, and Conclusion sections.  
In the Literature Review and Theory section, dominant theories as they relate to 
nationalism will be examined and discussed. In addition, other studies regarding 
nationalism will be critiqued. A detailed discussion of the research question, variables, 
and research design will be provided in the methodology section. Next, statistical and 
contextual data will be presented within the Data section as well a discussion of the 
results of the study, and finally, an interpretation of the findings will be discussed within 
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Chapter 2:  
Literature Review 
 
Social scientists have collectively termed various independence movements as 
nationalism. Though there are numerous models and alternative forms of nationalism, 
most political scientists have concluded that a nationalist movement has certain 
characteristics and attributes (Barrington 1997). According to scholar Lowell W. 
Barrington, “nearly all would agree, however, that the control over one’s own nation-
state is a goal for most nationalists” (Barrington 1997, 714). In essence, Barrington 
claims that territorial autonomy is the driving force behind nationalist movements (1997). 
John Breuilly, claims that nationalist movements adopt the philosophy defined by, “the 
interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values” 
(Breuilly 1993, 2). Ernest Gellner (1983, 1) defines nationalism as, “primarily a political 
principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent   It is a 
theory of political legitimacy” (Gellner 1983, 1). Finally, Brendan O'Leary believes that, 
"Nationalism the most potent principle of political legitimacy in the modern world, holds 
that the nation should be collectively and freely institutionally expressed, and ruled by its 
co-nationals" (O'Leary, 1997). Collectively, one can deduce from these claims that 
nationalism includes a desire for self-governance and a strong allegiance to the nation as 
opposed to the larger global structures. In addition, nationalism is a force that attempts to 
unify the populace to enact change and gain influence.  
Though there is consensus regarding some necessary components of nationalism, 
various potential causes of nationalism have been identified. Many foundational texts of 
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nationalism were based in the concept of primordialism, or based in the unification of 
blood, race, and language. According to Clifford Geertz (1973), these are, “ineffable and 
yet coercive ties, which are the result of a long process of crystallization” (Llobera 1999, 
3). Furthermore, these social biologists have concluded that, “Nationalism builds on 
ethnocentrism towards the in-group and xenophobia towards the out-group”(Llobera 
1999, 7).  
Theories of ethnic nationalism are commonly utilized to explain those nationalist 
movements within Europe. However, it seems that these attitudes of ethnic nationalism 
are often encouraged by other factors. Nagel writes that, “ethnic boundaries and meaning 
are also constructed from within and from without, propped up by internal and external 
pressures” (Nagel 1994, 167). In addition, ethnic groups often operate within other 
defined structures (Nagel 1994, 167). Nagel even asks, “From what social and 
psychological domains does the impulse toward ethnic identification originate?” (Nagel 
1994, 168). Therefore, it seems that strong feelings of ethnic nationalism and identity 
have an over-arching cause beyond ethnic divisions and therefore supports the notion that 
other policy areas should be analyzed to determine causes for nationalist sentiments.  
Another theoretical approach to explaining nationalism is modernization theories, 
which, “maintain that nationalism emerges as a result of the process of transition from 
traditional to modern society” (Llobera 1994, 10). However, these theories are 
predominantly used to account for nationalist movements during the time of 
industrialization. As much of Europe is developed and modern, these types of theories 
will not be useful in explaining more contemporary nationalist movements.  
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While cultural identity and modernization theories have been provided as possible 
explanations of nationalism, there are obvious flaws to these approaches and thus, 
foundations for my hypothesis are based in more economic and structural theories of 
nationalism.  
Though scholars have studied various forms of nationalism throughout the world 
and different cultures and contexts, the European Union provides an interesting social 
construct and governing structure to study the causes of nationalism and influences it 
may have in determining political structures. Furthermore, given that the European Union 
was largely founded to limit those forms of nationalism which had destroyed much of the 
continent during World War I and World War II, determining modern causes of 
nationalism within Europe may enhance understanding of the role nationalism may serve 
in developing future policies. In addition, unlocking keys to nationalism may also help 
prevent conflicts. According to Fraser Cameron, a senior advisor on European Policy, 
“Since the early 1950s, the EU has been a pioneer in regional integration” (Cameron 
2010). He also notes that the European Union has found success due to, “The political 
will to share sovereignty and construct strong, legally based, common institutions” 
(Cameron 2010) and maintain a “willingness to provide significant financial transfers to 
help poorer member states catch up with the norm” (Cameron 2010). Given that the 
European Union has worked to limit nationalism, understanding the relationship between 
contemporary nationalist movements and the EU is worth further examination as it may 
provide insights regarding the effects of globalization and regional integration.  
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As this study is concerned with nationalism within the European Union, it is 
important to explore reasons for the European Unions creation. According to author Ray 
Hudson, “The implication (of the EU) was that all would be better off, that spatial 
inequalities would be reduced, as markets were freed up and capital and labour moved to 
where returns were highest” (Hudson 2000, 413). Though the European Economic 
Community originally only had six members, it quickly began expanding in the 1980s. 
Hudson writes, “the pace of the process of integration via new forms of supra-national 
regulation again accelerated” (413). This resulted in the EU having, “much greater scope 
to influence the sectoral and socio-spatial distributions of economic activities, resources 
and income”(Hudson, 413). Therefore, for new member states to join the European 
Union or adopt European policies, they had to compromise aspects of their economic and 
resource sovereignty. Carl Lebeck also notes that the EU policy has resulted in the 
creation of distinct structures within the EU. He writes, “the structure of the EU 
comprises two different components, one supranational (the European Community - EC) 
and one intergovernmental (the European Union) (Lebeck 2007, 501). Furthermore, 
Madalina Calance believes that, “supranational organizations (such as the European 
Union), have a major impact on the sovereignty of the national state” (Calance 2012, 24).  
Christina J. Schneider also discusses the inherent tension that may occur between 
the EU and states. She writes, “EU members impose discriminatory measures on new 
members to redistribute enlargement gains from new members to particularly negatively 
affected EU members” (Schneider 2007, 85). For example, when negotiating the potential 
admittance of Turkey in 2004, Germany wanted to restrict the movement of labor while 
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other EU members advocated, “to refuse an allocation of agricultural subsidies to Turkish 
farmers” (Schneider 2007, 85).  
 According to Bellamy and Castiglione, “The related processes of globalization and 
social differentiation have undermined the state's claims to sovereignty” (1997, 421). 
Furthermore, they argue that, “these reports of the nation state’s demise to be exaggerated” 
(1997, 421). Bellamy and Castiglione conclude that both “the allegiances of citizens and 
their forms of economic, social and political interaction, cooperation and organization 
have become a complex mixture of the sub-national, national, and supranational”(1997, 
422). These authors also note that the desire for more local rights of citizens creates 
tension between the laws of the EU (1997, 431).  
 According to Jos de Beus, some scholars have adopted the view of supra-
nationalism, or the belief that, “democratic political union of Europe requires that its 
inhabitants consider themselves a single people or choose to remain one” (de Beus 2001, 
288-289).  In addition, de Beus argues that the European Union refers to the, “case for 
empowerment of the European Parliament, to all projects of fostering goodwill that try to 
bring the system of Europe closer to the daily life of ordinary citizens and to broad 
penetration of European agencies into the classic area of control of the nation state” 
(2001, 290). 
 James Anderson and James Goodwin also make note of the likely inherent tension 
between the EU and individual states. They write, “Sub-state regionalism is encouraged 
by some of the central institutions of the EU and by forces within the regions themselves 
responding to the Single European Market” (Anderson and Goodwin 1996, 600). They 
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also believe nations and states are being, “eroded from below by regionalism and from 
above by EU institutions and globalization- a pincer movement transforming traditional 
conceptions of territorial sovereignty and national identity” (1996, 601).  
Having reviewed numerous articles regarding the nature of relationship between 
the EU and member states, there is strong evidence to suggest that there is an inherent 
tension between the policies of the European Union and the sovereignty of various states. 
Therefore, these findings provide support for the notion that some European Union 
policies may lead to personal grievances and dislike for the EU. To determine if these 
grievances may lead to support for nationalist parties, it is important to document 
literature that attempts to assess causes for nationalist party support.  
While much research has been done with regard to various causes of state 
nationalism, less research has been directed toward determining linkages between state 
nationalism and support for nationalist political parties. Though parties are mentioned as 
a way to coalesce those of a certain ideology, scholars do not explore why some 
nationalist movements are more inclined to organize politically. While consideration of 
political structures and constitutional provisions that allow for policy change are evident 
(Beland and Lecours 2006), the likelihood of support for political parties in various 
environments is somewhat unexplored. These possible linkages between nationalism and 
political parties are worth consideration. Furthermore, while some studies have analyzed 
how certain social policies may increase support for nationalist political parties, less 
research has been directed at determining whether the nationalist parties themselves 
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advance or build upon perceived unjust policy. In essence, many studies seem to only 
provide half of the story as they do not provide content analysis of the parties themselves.  
 James Adams et al. provides evidence that those, “political parties in Western 
European democracies tend to shift their ideological orientations in response to shifts in 
voters' policy preferences” (Adams 2006, 513). Furthermore, William Heller determined 
that, “regional party participation in national policy making affects outcomes” (Heller 
2002, 657). Therefore, it seems that nationalist parties do respond to voter demands and 
can make policy changes.  
 Recently, Fortes and Perez examined nationalist during the Basque regional 
elections of 2012 in which the, “incumbent Socialist Party suffered a dramatic reduction 
in electoral support.” According to the authors, “influence of the economy was stronger 
than the nationalism issue” (Fortes and Perez 2013, 495). However, economic concerns 
likely encouraged some traditional socialist voters to consider the Basque Nationalist 
Party platform.  
 Other authors have traced nationalist party support to moral and social concerns. 
For example, Gavin Rae believes that conservative and nationalist party coalitions in 
Poland are gaining support through their emphasis on the immoral policies of liberalism. 
He writes, “It combines a criticism of both communism and liberalism, believing that 
both possess similar atheistic, nihilistic and immoral characteristics” (Rae 2008, 221). 
Furthermore, he writes that these parties, “propose a politicisation of the public sphere 
and support closing the gap between the Church and the State” (2008, 221). 
	   15	  
 Some studies find more broad influences on nationalist party support. Research of 
the UK Independence Party found evidence that the parties stances on immigration were 
often found to be popular among potential voters (Flamini 2013). However, the authors 
found that, “Exit polls after the May election showed more than fifty percent of those 
who voted for UKIP did so because they shared Farage's core objective of wanting to 
lead Britain out of the European Union” (Flamini 2013). Therefore, certain factors may 
have played a role for various individuals, a more general dislike for the European Union 
may have been more influential. 
 Anwen Elias analyzed the Plaid Cymru party in Wales and the Bloque 
Nacionalista Galego in Galicia. The author concludes that, “nationalist party attitudes 
towards European integration are more complex than is usually asserted in the existing 
academic literature” (Elias 2008, 557). In addition, Elias notes that these, “nationalist 
parties have become increasingly critical of Europe” (2008, 557).  
 Alberto Spektorowski analyzes the recent nationalist movements taking place 
within France. He argues that, “the European New Right employs a multiculturalism 
framework,” which he defines, “as a recognition/exclusionist one, in order to create a 
new discourse of legitimate exclusionism of non-authentic European immigrants” 
(Spektorowski 2008, 41).    
Christopher Baughn and Attila Yaprak discuss the role of economic nationalism 
in leading to support for nationalist political parties.  They note that, “Economic 
nationalism involves discrimination in favor of one's own nation, carried on as a matter of 
policy” (Baughn and Yaprak 1996, 760). The authors also note that this form of 
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nationalism, “has come to be associated with a wide range of practices, including 
protectionism in the form of tariffs, quotas, ‘voluntary’ restraint agreements, 
countervailing duties, and regulatory standards barring foreign products from the 
domestic market” (1996, 760). Finally, the authors note that, “Hostility, prejudice, and 
feeling threatened may facilitate political attempts to arouse public support for such a 
campaign” (1996, 760).  
 In essence it seems that most authors have argued that support for nationalist 
parties is either based in theories of economics or ethnic conflict. However, it seems that 
cultural and economic nationalism may become disparate because of other underlying 
factors. In addition, many of these studies do not mention the European Union as being a 
major contributing factor in increasing support for nationalist political parties. 
Furthermore, there may also be another factor that serves as the genesis of both economic 
and cultural nationalism. Finally, some developments in Europe suggest that resources 
and energy policy are influential within state level politics.  
 Scholars have coined the term resource nationalism to define those movements 
related to seeking greater control over a nation’s resources. Halina Ward writes, 
“Resource nationalism is characterized by the tendency for states to take (or seek to take) 
direct and increasing control of economic activity in natural resource sectors”  (Ward 
2009, 5). In addition, though these movements have typically been viewed as being a part 
of developing countries, some evidence suggests that this trend is shifting. Clifford 
Chance LLP writes, "Resource nationalism is sometimes mistakenly seen as a purely 
developing world or emerging market phenomenon”(Hill et al. 2012).   
	   17	  
 In the 1920s and 1930s, Swedish nationalist parties emphasized utilizing national 
fuel sources. Ekerholm writes, “At the time, considerable political effort went into 
finding and establishing a national fuel” (Ekerholm 2013, 63). Furthermore, “Those who 
argued in favour of the ethanol industry's requests were mainly right-wing politicians, 
who based their arguments on a nationalist ideology” (2013, 63). In Norway during the 
1960s, “New regulation determined that the State owns any natural resources on the NCS, 
and that only the King (government) is authorized to award licences for exploration and 
production”(Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2013).    
 In addition, Ireland has seen recent developments in resource nationalist ideology. 
According to Vincent Salafia, “with growing public awareness and opposition to multiple 
government policies and programs, all around Ireland, the pressure is mounting on the 
Government to fundamentally change its policy, and ensure the people get greater control 
over, and a great share of the benefit from, their valuable natural resources and State 
assets” (Salafia 2013). According to Salafia, “EU regulations prohibiting turf cutting 
appear to have been unfairly implemented” (2013). Furthermore, “the manner in which 
European regulations concerning certain peat bogs are being implemented” is seen as 
unjust (2013). There have also been numerous protests regarding the EU Common 
Agriculture Policy within Ireland (2013). In Norway and Great Britain various concerns 
about the oil reserves and the states’ rights have been raised prompting some to consider 
the growing role of resource nationalism in state politics (Salafia, 2013). Hudson also 
outlines numerous examples of how European Union policy is “problematic and 
contradictory” (Hudson 2000, 414). Hudson identifies the Common Agricultural Policy 
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as an example of how European Union policies are controversial. He writes, “The CAP is 
symptomatic of the contradictions encompassed within one particular political-economic 
conception of Europe, and recognition of the political constraints on free market policies. 
As such, it sits very uneasily with the rhetoric of the superiority of market resource 
allocation” (Hudson 2000, 414).  Furthermore, the recent protests in Ukraine, though not 
in opposition to the EU, do relate strongly to energy policies. The President of Ukraine, 
Viktor  Yanukovych, “insisted that he was intent on signing  historical political and trade 
agreement with the European Union” (Saeed et al 2014). However, he later backed out of 
the agreement, which prompted large scale protests that have culminated in violence. 
According to social scientists, “Russia threatened its much smaller neighbor with trade 
sanctions and steep gas bills if Ukraine forged ahead. If Ukraine didn't, and instead joined 
a Moscow-led Customs Union, it would get deep discounts on natural gas” (Saeed et al 
2014). Therefore it seems that energy policies can play a role in determining the actions 
of leaders and controlling policies can indirectly encourage nationalist type movements.   
 Evidence suggests that the growing emphasis on energy and resources may be a 
catalyst for dissatisfaction for the EU and increased support for more nationalist political 
parties within Europe. In addition, these types of relationships may also apply to other 
regions of the world. Perceived lack of control over resources may encourage forms of 
ethnic nationalism as the new immigrants are seen as using current finite energy 
resources. In addition, the lack of control over resources and energy may be seen as 
detrimental to economic growth. Perhaps concern over energy and resources may serve 
as a driving force of both economic and ethnic nationalism. Therefore, understanding 
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linkages between energy and resource policy and nationalist party support may provide 
new insights into the causes of nationalism and also provide insight regarding the future 



















 Following a review of literature germane to nationalism, the European Union, 
support for nationalist political parties, and the development of resource nationalism, it 
seems that energy policies of the European Union may be a driving force of nationalist 
party support. To further examine my hypothesis that, “Perceived unjust European Union 
energy policies results in increased support for nationalist political parties within various 
states within the European Union” a mixed method approach will be adopted and 
implemented. If my hypothesis is proven and conclusive, it may be prescient as a 
significant factor in the potential dissolution or restructuring of the European Union.  
In this chapter, a justification for the mixed method strategy will be provided, variables 
will be operationalized, and a detailed methodology will be described.  
 This study will consist of two separate methods, that when combined, should 
provide insight into whether perceived unjust European Union energy policies are a 
causal factor of nationalist party support. These two methods will include a descriptive 
statistical analysis that will subsequently determine which case studies of the dependent 
variable (nationalist political parties) will be examined through content analysis. By 
adopting an approach that includes statistical or quantitative analysis, and by 
incorporating content or qualitative analysis, a more comprehensive overview and 
examination of the variables can be provided. Furthermore, while a statistical analysis 
may provide insights regarding correlation of my two variables, some level content 
analysis is needed to further determine causation between the two variables.   
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 Some authors believe that incorporating both methods of analysis is beneficial to 
the research process. According to Jick, “qualitative and quantitative methods should be 
viewed as complementary rather than as rival camps” (Jick 1979, 602). Furthermore, 
Bryman has noted that, “This has led to the appearance of mixed method approaches and 
the use of triangulation” (Bryman 2004, 454). Giovanni Sartori writes, “Especially during 
the last decade comparative politics as a substantive field has been rapidly expanding” 
(Sartori 1970, 1053). Sartori believes that these methods can be utilized and implemented 
together. He writes, “To recapitulate and conclude, I have argued that the logic of either-
or cannot be replaced by the logic of more-and-less. Actually the two logics(quantitative 
and qualitative methods) are complementary and each has a legitimate field of application” 
(Sartori 1970, 1039). In addition, Evan S. Lieberman notes that, "statistical analyses can 
guide case selection for in-depth research, provide direction for more focused case 
studies and comparisons, and be used to provide additional tests of hypotheses generated 
from small-N research" (Lieberman 2005, 435). In addition, Lieberman writes, "In a 
somewhat different formulation, several scholars have called for greater integration of 
methodological approaches" (2005, 435). The approach outlined by Lieberman also 
applies very well to my study. Lieberman notes, "Although all of the examples discussed 
in the article are concerned with country or national-level analyses, the strategies 
described here should apply to any comparative analysis of social units for which both 
quantitative and in-depth case study data can be obtained" (2005, 436). Given that my 
study will include a more national level of analysis regarding attitudes of European 
Union energy policies and a more in-depth analysis of nationalist political parties, it will 
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fit well within a mixed method framework. Lieberman continues by writing, "Thus the 
approach could be applied to the analysis of individual behaviors or attitudes, but only if 
the researcher were willing able to gather new data about particular individuals through 
extensive interview or related approaches..." (2005, 436) Since my study will include 
analysis of the rhetoric of nationalist party doctrine, I will be able to effectively gather 
data about particular individuals or groups of people. Therefore, it seems that the 
quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis can work collaboratively and collectively 
to provide insight regarding my hypothesis.  
 Having determined that a mixed method approach would be most effective in 
analyzing the validity of my hypothesis, it is important to further describe statistical 
analysis and content analysis respectively. Numerous scholars have encouraged 
utilization of the statistical analysis method approach. For example, James Hutter 
attempts, “to draw to the attention of statisticians certain implications important to both 
disciplines, statistics and political science” (Hutter 1972, 735). Therefore, it seems that 
Hutter believes statistics and political science can be utilized together and combined. 
Furthermore, King, Tomz, and Wittenberg write that, “Our proposals for extracting new 
information from existing statistical models should enable scholars to interpret and 
present their results in ways that convey numerically precise estimates of the quantities of 
substantive interest” (1998, 23). Gilham believes that, “quantitative data and its analysis 
can add to the overall picture" (Gilham 2000, 80). Finally, according to Brad T. Gomez, 
statistical analysis is beneficial as ,“the use of data to generate descriptions or summaries 
of political phenomena, facilitating comparisons across space and time, and the use of 
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available data to draw inferences about the broader political world” (Gomez 2009, 1). 
Though statistical analysis has obvious benefits in interpreting data, this methodological 
approach also fits well within the framework of my study.   
 For example, as this study is concerned with the entire European Union, a 
statistical analysis of data related to the EU would be effective in providing an aggregate 
model of my variables to determine if a correlation exists between them. Furthermore, a 
statistical analysis can allow countries that may have very different economic and social 
structures to be systematically compared with reference to my variables. For example, a 
descriptive statistical comparison of the original six members of the European Union with 
more recent members may provide insights into differences in attitudes of various states. 
Finally, a statistical analysis can establish variances between my variables within 
different countries, and therefore, help determine potential case studies.  
 Though a statistical analysis can provide insights regarding a potential 
relationship between the variables of my hypothesis, it would only provide an aggregate 
level analysis due to the absence of perfect data. Therefore, to further prove or disprove 
my hypothesis, there is a need to adopt a more individual level of analysis or content 
analysis. Within this study, the process of content analysis will resemble case study 
analysis as the various doctrines of different nationalist political parties will be analyzed.  
Bernard Berelson defines content analysis as, "a research technique for the objective, 
systematic, and quantitative description of manifest content of communications" 
(Berelson 1952, 74). BD Prasad writes that, “content analysis falls in the interface of 
observation and document analysis” (2008, 2) and notes that when utilizing the content 
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analysis methodology, “The researcher asks the question, ‘what do I want to find out 
from this communication content’” (2008, 9). According to Prasad, “Holsti (1968) says 
that it is any technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively 
identifying specified characteristics of messages” (Prasad 2008, 2). In addition, Prasad 
writes that, Kerlinger (1986) defined content analysis as a, “method of studying and 
analyzing communication in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner for the 
purpose of measuring variables” (2008, 2). According to Babbie, content analysis is, 
"essentially a coding operation," with coding being, "the process of transforming raw data 
into a standardized form" (Babbie 2001, p.309). Finally, Bryman recognizes that, "There 
is an emphasis on allowing categories to emerge out of data and on recognizing the 
significance for understanding the meaning of the context in which an item being 
analyzed (and the categories derived from it) appeared" (Bryman 2004, p.542). Therefore, 
it seems that content analysis of nationalist party documents would provide a systematic 
and objective way to determine possible relationships between my variables. Furthermore, 
through the process of coding, an applicable model or framework can be used to provide 
more systematic findings.  
Prasad also notes that because content analysis is objective, systematic, and 
generalizable, it serves as an effective method to resolve hypotheses (Prasad 2008, 3). 
Content analysis can also, “reveal something about the nature of the audience” (Prasad 
2008, 3). In addition, through the implementation of content and case study analysis, 
greater insight into whether the nationalist parties themselves advocate against European 
Union energy polices will be provided. Furthermore, this is an approach that seems to 
	   25	  
have seldom been adopted by many articles related to nationalism and support for 
nationalist political parties.  
In addition, other methodological approaches are somewhat inadequate for 
determining the accuracy of my hypothesis. For example, because my study is more 
concerned with contemporary nationalist movements, archival research is irrelevant. 
Furthermore, due to obvious limitations regarding travel, accurate survey research and 
interview strategies are not possible. In addition, a single case study method would 
provide good insight regarding the possible impact of European Union energy policies 
within one country. However, research of a single nation would not allow me to compare 
my results with other countries or areas of the world to confirm the relationship between 
my variables. Finally, as this study is attempting to provide analysis regarding 
nationalism and the European Union as a whole, a single case study does not seem to 
provide enough evidence to prove or disprove my hypothesis. Therefore, due to the in-
depth research required as well as the need to systematically compare findings, the mixed 
method approach is the most effective means to provide an answer to my research 
question.  
Before data collection can be implemented, variables within my study must be 
operationalized. In addition, data sources must be evaluated, and those nationalist parties 
that will be examined with content analysis must be finalized. The first objective is to 
identify each variable, determine how each will be operationalized, and resolve the means 
of data collection. 
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My independent variable is perceived unjust European Union energy policies. To 
operationalize this variable within the statistical analysis portion of my study, I will 
analyze Eurobarometer survey data. The Eurobarometer has monitored opinions and 
attitudes within the European Union since 1973 through the use of surveys and data 
collection regarding key topics and issue areas. One of the questions asked by the 
Eurobarometer Survey attempts to obtain information regarding European attitudes 
toward energy policies of the European Union. The question asks, “And for each of the 
following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) 
Government, or made jointly within the European Union?” (Eurobarometer 73.4, 561). 
One of these issue areas is energy policy. Though this question does not provide a perfect 
analysis of the grievances against European Union energy policies, it does provide a 
sense as to whether citizens of each European country have more or less faith in the 
energy policies of the EU as compared to their member states. Furthermore, a state in 
which many respondents endorse state level energy policy would suggest that European 
Union energy policy is unjust while a state in which many respondents are in favor of 
joint energy policy suggests that they consider EU energy policy to be just.  
My dependent variable is support for nationalist political parties. To 
operationalize this variable within the statistical analysis portion of my study, I also will 
utilize Eurobarometer survey data. One of the questions asked by the Eurobarometer 
Survey attempts to determine which political party respondents within different countries 
align themselves. The question asks, "To which of the following political parties do you 
feel the closest to or the least furthest from?" (Eurobarometer 71.1, 543). This question is 
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asked to respondents from a number of European countries and utilizes the ZEUS Party 
Family Code to code those political parties within the individual state. For example, those 
parties given a number between 600-699 are nationalist political parties. Since the 
various answers provided to the survey have already been coded, it is possible to 
determine what number of respondents align themselves with nationalist political parties. 
Furthermore, since this variable has been coded, it allows the data to be systematically 
compared between different states (Eurobarometer 71.1, xx).  
It is important to note that this data will come from a different survey from the 
previous year as the independent and dependent variable questions were asked different 
years. Given that the respondents are different, it will not be possible to run a traditional 
statistical analysis with the data. However, more basic statistical analyses can be run to 
provide insight regarding potential patterns and correlations between variables. In 
addition, it will be possible to utilize descriptive statistics to analyze patterns between EU 
energy and support for nationalist political parties of this time period.  
  After completion of this statistical analysis, each member state of the European 
Union will have data that relates to my independent variable and my dependent variable 






































 After accumulating and analyzing the data within the statistical analysis portion of 
my study, all countries will fit into one the four quadrants as outlined above. If my 
hypothesis is correct, most countries will be located in the yellow squares(labeled A and 
D) and if my hypothesis is not correct, most countries will be located in the green squares, 
(labeled B and C).  
 In addition to providing a descriptive statistical analysis of the data from two 
different data sets, another statistical analysis may be run using only the data from the 
2009 Eurobarometer Survey. To operationalize my independent variable within this 
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statistical analysis, a question regarding the distribution of energy will be utilized. The 
question asks, "And for each of the following issues in (OUR COUNTRY), do you think 
that the European Union plays a positive role, a negative role, or neither positive nor 
negative role?" (Eurobarometer 71.1, 342). Though this question does not provide a 
perfect analysis of the grievances against the European Union with regard to energy 
policy, it does provide insights to the attitudes respondents had toward the EU with 
regard to energy supply. Those respondents who feel the European Union plays a 
negative role in energy supply would likely feel that the energy policies of the EU are 
unjust while those who feel the European Union plays a positive role in energy supply 
would likely view European Union energy policies as being more just than those who 
believe the European Union plays a negative role. The dependent variable within this 
statistical analysis will be the same as in the first statistical analysis as the question, " To 
which of the following political parties do you feel the closest to or the least furthest 
from?" (Eurobarometer 71.1, 543), will be utilized. In addition, results from questions 
that ask which political party a respondent last voted for or the party that respondents felt 
best represented them within the European Union level, will be analyzed and used as 
dependent variables within the regression models (Eurobarometer 71.1, 540, 679). These 
results using different dependent variables will be recorded and analyzed. Furthermore, 
various controls will be added to regression models to further provide insight regarding 
the relationship of the variables and whether certain contexts change the level of 
significance between the variables. These would include the time in which certain 
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countries joined the EU(newer or older members), the geography of countries(Eastern or 
Western Europe), and the GDP per capita levels of different countries.  
 After completing the statistical analysis aspects of my study, I will implement the 
content analysis portion of my study. The content analysis will consist of a further 
examination of nationalist political parties within two European countries to be 
determined from results of the statistical analysis portion of my study. The content 
analysis will consist of analyzing party doctrines of nationalist political parties to 
determine if they address grievances against EU energy policies. Determining if they do 
may provide evidence that those nationalist parties gain support by advocating against 
EU energy policies. Nationalist parties will be further examined in a country that has a 
high belief that EU energy policies are unjust and high support for nationalist political 
parties. The other case study will have high levels of the independent variable but not the 
dependent variable. In other words, the nationalist political parties will be further 
examined in a country that has a high level of belief that EU energy policies are unjust 
but low levels of support for nationalist political parties. In addition, the statistical 
analysis will be utilized to further determine case studies. The case study in which is 
there a high level of perceived unjust EU energy policies and high levels of support for 
nationalist political parties will be called Case A. The case study in which there is a high 
level of perceived unjust EU energy policies and low levels of support for nationalist 
political parties will be called Case B. Here is a diagram to demonstrate how cases will 
be chosen: 
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 It is also worth nothing that cases will have similar levels of GDP to isolate my 
independent and dependent variables as much as possible. The variance in the level of the 
dependent variable is important for the following reasons. If in Case A, it is found that 
the nationalist political party strongly advocates against EU energy policies, it would 
provide support for my hypothesis as it provides evidence that speaking out against EU 
energy policies is a main reason for the parties support. However, if there is little 
evidence that the nationalist party in Case A advocates against EU energy policies, it 
provides evidence in favor of the null hypothesis, or that EU energy policies are not a 
driving force of nationalist party support. If in Case B, it is found the nationalist party 
strongly advocates against EU energy policies, it provides evidence in favor of the null 
hypothesis as the nationalist party does not seem to be gaining support by speaking out 
against EU energy policies. However, if in Case B, it is found that the nationalist political 
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party does not advocate against EU energy policies, it provides evidence to support my 
hypothesis as it could be argued support for the nationalist party is low because they do 
not advocate against EU energy policies.  
 In essence, if there is more evidence that nationalist political parties in Case A 
advocate against EU energy policies as compared to Case B, it provides evidence that 
perceived unjust energy policies may in fact be a driving force for nationalist party 
support. Furthermore, it would directly provide evidence that those nationalist political 
parties that speak out against EU energy policies have more success than those parties 
that do not.  This would suggest that perceived unjust EU energy policies may serve as a 
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 As noted in the methodology section, this study will utilize a mixed method 
approach. The first method consists of a statistical analysis of survey data from the 
Eurobarometer Survey as it relates to my two variables. Having organized the data into 
excel tables and subsequently run regressions of the different variables using the Stata 
program, I am able to report on preliminary findings. Given the number of survey 
questions I utilized within the statistical analysis portion of my study, I will present the 
data by individually discussing the findings of each question to provide a more 
comprehensive analysis. However before individual questions are discussed, it is 
important to note that while the independent and dependent variables seem to share a 
relationship based upon P values, many regressions do not provide a statistically 
significant result. However, different variable models resulted in varying levels of 
significance.  
 Data for the first question was gathered from the May 2010 Eurobarometer 
Survey which asked if respondents were more in favor state level energy policies or joint 
energy policies with the EU (Eurobarometer 73.4, 561).  Only the number of those who 
voted for state level policies were recorded, as their responses suggest that they have a 
grievance against the energy policies of the European Union.  
 The results are presented below with the country and the percentage of 
respondents in favor of state level energy policies. As noted in the methodology section, 
data from this question serves as the independent variable.  
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Source: Data from Eurobaromter 73.4 
 
As evidenced by the charts above, Austria, Finland, and Great Britain all maintain 
the most support for state level energy policies. Other countries with higher levels of 
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Greece, and Bulgaria. Countries with the least support for state level energy policies 
include Latvia, Lithuania, Denmark, Cyprus, and Germany (Eurobarometer 73.4, 562).  It 
is also important to acknowledge that while there is variance in the levels of support for 
state level energy policies, only Austria and the United Kingdom have support levels 
above fifty percent.  
 In order to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the independent variable of 
grievances against EU energy policies, data will also be recorded from a February 2009 
Eurobarometer Survey which asked respondents to determine whether the European 
Union plays a negative, neutral, or positive role in the distribution of energy  
(Eurobarometer 71.1, 342). To measure grievances against EU energy policies, only 
those respondents said that the EU played a negative role in energy supply were recorded. 
The results are presented below with the country and the percentage of respondents that 
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Graph 2: Percentage that Believe EU  
Plays a Negative Role in Energy Supply 
 
 
Source: Data from Eurobaromter 71.1 
Countries with greatest percentage of respondents that said the EU plays a 
negative role included, Bulgaria, Great Britain, and Lithuania. Countries with the least 
percentage of people who believed the EU plays a negative role in energy supply include 
Cyprus and Denmark (Eurobarometer 71.1, 343). 
In addition to using the Eurobarometer survey to collect data relating to my 
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to my dependent variable. The first question from which data was recorded from came 
from the February 2009 Eurobarometer Survey, which asked to which political party did 
the respondents feel the greatest attachment (Eurobarometer 71.1, 543).  Respondents that 
said they felt closest to a nationalist or regionalist political party were recorded. The 
results are presented below with the country and percentage of respondents that feel the 
greatest attachment to a nationalist party.  
Graph 3: Percentage that Feel Greatest  
Attachment to Nationalist Party 
 
  
Source: Data from Eurobaromter 71.1 
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As evidenced by the chart above, Malta, Northern Ireland, Austria, Finland and 
Slovakia have the most support for nationalist or regionalist political parties. Denmark 
and Italy also have higher levels of support. However, countries such as Sweden, Cyprus, 
and Portugal have minimal if any support for nationalist parties (Eurobarometer 71.1, 
544). As a whole, not many countries have more than ten percent support for nationalist 
parties. However, it is possible that this question was ineffective in capturing whether 
people have support for nationalist parties. Therefore, data from other Eurobarometer 
questions will be analyzed. 
 The second question data was recorded from asked respondents to which political 
party did they vote for in the last election (Eurobarometer 71.1, 540). Those respondents 
who said they voted for a nationalist political party were recorded. Results are presented 
below with the country and percentage of respondents who reported that they voted for a 
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Graph 4: Percentage that Voted for Nationalist Party 
 
 
 Source: Data from Eurobaromter 71.1 
 
 
Countries with the greatest percentage of respondents that voted for a nationalist 
party include Malta, Slovakia, Northern Ireland, Austria, and Bulgaria. Countries with the 
fewest percentage of respondents who voted for a nationalist political party, included 
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 The final question that data was recorded from asked respondents to which party 
did they feel closest to on EU issues. Those respondents who said that they felt closest to 
a nationalist political party were recorded. Results are presented below which the country 
and the percentage of respondents who reported that they felt closest to a nationalist 
political party on EU issues (Eurobarometer 71.1, 579). 
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Countries with the greatest percentage of respondents that felt closest to a 
nationalist party on EU issues included Malta, Slovakia, Northern Ireland, Austria, 
Bulgaria, and Lithuania. Countries with the fewest number of respondents that felt closest 
to a nationalist political party on EU issues included Cyprus, Germany, Sweden, Ireland, 
and Luxembourg. Based on a quick review on the data, it seems Austria, Malta, and 
Slovakia all have higher levels of support for nationalist parties while Sweden, Portugal, 
and Ireland seem to have lower levels of support for nationalist parties (Eurobarometer 
71.1, 540). Following a report of the variables, regression models of the different 
variables were designed and run. It is important to note that Northern Ireland and Malta, 
given their outlier status, were not included in the regressions.  
Table 1: Regression Analysis 



































P value  .159 .235 .331 .355 .117 .226 
R2 .081 .058 .040 .045 .099 .060 
N 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Source: Data from Eurobaromter 71.1 and 73.4. Dependent Variables are 
different depending on model. Variables listed with coefficient first then standard error in 
parentheses as from Stata regression. State Level Support relates to state level energy 
policies and EU plays negative role relates to negative role in distribution of energy.  
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The first regression that was run utilized the dependent variable of attachment to 
nationalist political parties and the independent variable of support for more state level 
energy policies. As reported by Model 1, Table 1, the regression provided a P value 
of .159, which is not statistically significant and therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected.  
 The second regression that was run utilized the same independent variable of 
support for state level energy policies but implemented the dependent variable of support 
for nationalist parties on EU issues. The results of the regression as reported by Table 1, 
Model 2, the regression provided a P value of .235, which is not statistically significant.  
The third regression that was run utilized the same independent variable of 
support for state level energy policies but implemented the dependent variable of voted 
for a nationalist political party. The results of the regression as reported by Table 1, 
Model 3, provided a P value of .331 which is not statistically significant. 
 After running regressions using the independent variable of support for more state 
level energy policies with a variety of dependent variables, the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected. The regression with the most statistically significant P value utilized the variable 
of support for nationalist political parties. Regressions were also run using the 
independent variable of a belief that the EU plays a negative role in the distribution of 
energy.  
The first regression included the dependent variable of support for nationalist 
political parties. The results of the regression, as reported by Table 1, Model 4, provided 
a P value of .355, which is not statistically significant. As with previous regressions, the 
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linear graph of the variables suggested a positive correlation, the null hypothesis cannot 
be rejected.  
 The second regression included the dependent variable of support for nationalist 
parties on issues pertaining to the EU. The results of the regression as reported by Table 1, 
Model 5, provided a P value of .117, which is not statistically significant. As with 
previous regressions, though the variables suggested a positive correlation, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected.  
 The third regression included the dependent variable of voted for a nationalist 
political party. The results of the regression, as reported by Table 1, Model 6, provided a 
P value of .226, which is not statistically significant. As with previous regressions, the 
linear graph of the variables suggested a positive correlation, the null hypothesis cannot 
be rejected.  
 After running regressions with the independent variable of a belief that the EU 
plays a negative role in energy supply with a variety of dependent variables, the null 
hypothesis cannon be rejected. The regression with the most statistically significant P 
value utilized the dependent variable of support for nationalist political parties on issues 
pertaining to the EU. However, none of the regressions provided a significant enough P 
value to reject the null hypothesis.  
Though the regressions that utilized those independent and dependent variables 
outlined above did not provide a statistically significant P value, incorporating more 
control variables may provide different results. Therefore the 2011 GDP per capita 
(constant 2005 US dollars) of different countries will also be incorporated into the next 
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series of regressions as from the World Bank World Development Indicators Report 
(World Bank, October 2013). As with the other regressions, Malta and Northern Ireland 
will be excluded as outliers.   
Table 2: Regression Analysis 

















































P value  .236 .168 .244 .386 .284 .148 
R2 .092 .082 .080 .036 .081 .109 
N 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Source: Data from Eurobaromter 71.1 and 73.4 and World Bank 2011 GDP per 
capita, Constant 2005 U.S. Dollars. Dependent Variables are different depending on 
model. Variables listed with coefficient first then standard error in parentheses as from 
Stata regression. State Level Support relates to state level energy policies and EU plays 
negative role relates to negative role in distribution of energy.  
 
 
The first regression incorporated the independent variable of attachment to state 
level energy policies and the dependent variable of support for nationalist political parties. 
In addition the control variable of GDP will also be included. The results of the 
regression as reported by Table 2, Model 1, provided a P value of .236, which is not 
statistically significant. Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.  
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The second regression kept everything the same except the dependent variable 
shifted to voted for a nationalist political party. The results of the regression as reported 
by Table 2, Model 2 provided a P value of .168, which is not statistically significant. 
However, these results are more significant than the first regression.  
The third regression changed the dependent variable to support for support for 
nationalist parties on issues pertaining to the EU. The regression as reported by Table 2, 
Model 3, provided a P value of .244, which is not statistically significant.  
 The next set of regressions incorporated the independent variable of a belief that 
the EU plays a negative role in energy supply. The first regression implemented the 
dependent variable of attachment to nationalist political parties. As reported by Table 2, 
Model 4, the regression provided a P value of .386, which is not statistically significant. 
In fact, this regression suggests that hardly any relationship between the variables exists.  
 The second regression implemented the dependent variable of voted for 
nationalist political parties. The results of the regression as reported by Table 2, Model 5, 
provided a P value of .284, which is not statistically significant.  
 Finally, the third regression implemented the dependent variable of support for 
nationalist parties on issues pertaining to the EU. The results of the regression as reported 
by Table 2, Model 6, provided a P value of .148, which is not statistically significant.  
After running regressions implementing the control variable of GDP per capita, 
the results largely mirror those regressions that didn’t include GDP per capita. Therefore, 
it seems that while positive relationships exist between my variables, the resulting P 
values cannot reject the null hypothesis. However, it may be beneficial to document 
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difference between member states based upon respective economic wealth or date in 
which they were admitted to the EU. These examinations may unlock keys as to what 
may drive nationalist party support.  
Table 3: Regression Analysis 











































.548 .719 .631 .603 .520 .738 
R2 .097 .446 .204 .065 .023 .020 
N 6 6 8 8 20 12 
Source: Data from Eurobarometer 71.1 and 73.4 and World Bank 2011 GDP per 
capita, Constant 2005 U.S. Dollars. Dependent Variables are different depending on 
model. Variables listed with coefficient first then standard error in parentheses as from 
Stata regression. State Level Support relates to state level energy policies and EU plays 
negative role relates to negative role in distribution of energy. .  
 
 First a regression was run implementing the independent variable of support for 
state level energy policies and the dependent variable of voted for nationalist political 
parties. This regression only observed 6 case studies, or the original 6 members of the EU. 
These include Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, France, Netherlands, and Belgium. The 
results of the regression as reported by Table 3, Model 1, provided a P value of .548, 
which is not statistically significant.  
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In a second regression, GDP per capita was added as a control variable. As 
reported by Table 3, Model 2, this changed the P value to .719 demonstrating a less 
significant relationship between the variables. This makes intuitive sense on one level 
because the original six members have higher GDP per capita than other new members.  
This view is somewhat confirmed by a third regression that used the same 
variables but utilized the case studies of the eight countries with the highest GDP per 
capita. The results of the regression as reported by Table 3, Model 3, provided a P value 
of .631, which is statistically insignificant.  
 Interestingly, when the eight countries with the lowest GDP per capita were 
utilized as case studies, the P value became .603 as reported by Table 3, Model 4. Though 
this value is insignificant, they are slightly more significant than those of the higher GDP 
countries. However this difference is not large enough to be seen as a causal connection.  
 Therefore, the membership status might be a better predictor than the GDP per 
capita of countries. When the original six members were not included in the regression 
that implemented the independent variable of support for state level energy policies and 
the dependent variable of voted for nationalist parties, the P value was .520 as reported 
by Table 3, Model 5. This value is very similar to those of the original six members of the 
EU, with the newer members providing a slightly more significant P value.  
 Finally, when the GDP per capital was added as a control variable when analyzing 
the newest 12 members, the P value rose to .738 as reported by Table 3, Model 6, 
suggesting that the relationship was not significant and that new members demonstrate 
less of a relationship between the variables than the older members.  
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 Though time of membership and GDP do not seem to be highly significant factors, 
perhaps the geographic location of respective countries may provide further insight 
regarding the level of significance between variables. Therefore, the EU countries were 
divided into Eastern and Western groups with twelve countries in the Western Group 
inclusive of Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Great Britain, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden. Eastern Group consisted of fourteen 
countries inclusive of: Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia.  
Table 4: Regression Analysis 















































P value  .941 .205 .627 .275 .925 .229 
R2 .009 .143 .043 .279 .001 .127 
N 12 14 12 14 12 14 
Source: Data from Eurobarometer 71.1 and 73.4 and World Bank 2011 GDP per 
capita, Constant 2005 U.S. Dollars. Dependent Variables are different depending on 
model. Variables listed with coefficient first then standard error in parentheses as from 
Stata regression. State Level Support relates to state level energy policies and EU plays 
negative role relates to negative role in distribution of energy.   
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 The first set of regressions incorporated the dependent variable of voted for a 
nationalist party, the independent variable of support for state level energy policies, and a 
control variable of GDP per capita. The results of the regression using the Western 
Countries provided a p value of .941 as reported by Table 4, Model 1, which is very 
insignificant.            
 The results of the regression using the Eastern Group provided a P value of .205 
as reported by Table 4, Model 2, which is not statistically significant, but much more 
significant than the Western Group. This suggests that the variables within the study 
might be more significant within Eastern Europe.  
 The second set of regressions changed the dependent variable to attachment to 
nationalist political parties. The results of the regression using the Western Group 
provided a P value of .627 as reported by Table 4, Model 3, which is not statistically 
significant.  
            The results of the regression using the Eastern Group provided a P value of .275 
as reported by Table 4, Model 4, which is not statistically significant. However, these 
values demonstrate the same pattern of the variables being more significant within 
Eastern European Countries.  
 The third set of regressions changed the dependent variable to support for 
nationalist parties on issues pertaining to the EU. The results of the regression using the 
Western Group provided a P value of .925 as reported by Table 4, Model 5.  
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 The results of the regression using the Eastern Group provide a P value of .229 as 
reported by Table 4, Model 6. As seen with the previous regressions, the variables are 
more significant in Eastern Europe as compared to Western Europe.  
 The next set of regressions incorporated the independent variable with a belief 
that the EU plays a negative role in energy supply, the dependent variable of voted for 
nationalist political parties, and a control variable of GDP per capita.  
 
Table 5: Regression Analysis 













































P value  .290 .108 .346 .066 .461 .035 
R2 .130 .247 .114 .413 .065 .386 
N 12 14 12 14 12 14 
Source: Data from Eurobarometer 71.1 and 73.4 and World Bank 2011 GDP per 
capita, Constant 2005 U.S. Dollars. Dependent Variables are different depending on 
model. Variables listed with coefficient first then standard error in parentheses as from 
Stata regression. State Level Support relates to state level energy policies and EU plays 
negative role relates to negative role in distribution of energy.  
 
 The results of the regression for the Western Group provided a P value of .290 as 
reported by Table 5, Model 1, which is not significant.  
 However, these values are more significant than the values for the Western Group 
using the previous independent variable. The results of the regression using the Eastern 
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Group provided a P value of .108 as reported by Table 5, Model 2. This value is 
extremely close to being statistically significant and remains consistent with the results of 
the previous regressions.  
 The next set of regressions changed the dependent variable to support for or 
attachment to nationalist political parties. The results of the regression for the Western 
Group provided a P value of .346 as reported by Table 5, Model 3, which is not 
statistically significant.  
            The results of the regression for the Eastern group provided a P value of .066 as 
reported by Table 5, Model 4, which is nearly or even statistically significant. As with 
previous regressions, the Eastern Group provided a more statistically significant 
regression.  
 The next set of regressions changed the dependent variable to support for 
nationalist political parties on issues pertaining to the EU. The results of the regression 
for the Western Group provided a P value of .461 as reported by Table 5, Model 5, which 
is not statistically significant.  
 The results of the regression for the Eastern Group provided a P value of .035 as 
reported by Table 5, Model 6, which is statistically significant.  
 As with previous regressions, the Eastern Group was more statistically significant. 
Furthermore, given the strong levels of significance, it seems that an argument could be 
made that variables within this study have a statistical relationship within the context of 
Eastern European countries.  
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 In addition, it seems that a potential relationship between my variables may be 
better seen on an individual level. Perhaps the rhetoric of nationalist parties themselves is 
a linking factor between a dissatisfaction with EU energy policies and support for 
nationalist political parties. Therefore the rhetoric and party platforms of nationalist 
parties will be analyzed in two countries. One case study will be a country that has high 
levels of dissatisfaction with EU energy policies and high levels of support for nationalist 
political parties and the other case study will consist of a country with high levels of 
dissatisfaction with EU energy polices and low support for nationalist political parties. 
Analyzing the rhetoric of the nationalist parties themselves may provide a more 
comprehensive examination of the relationship between the variables. As evidenced by 
the data, Finland has high levels of support for state level energy policies and high levels 
of support for nationalist political parties while the Netherlands has higher levels of 
support for state energy policies, but low levels of support for nationalist political parties. 
Comparing the rhetoric and platforms of nationalist parties within these two countries 














	   53	  
Content Analysis of Case Studies 
 
 To further engage those variables outlined within my methodology section, 
content analysis of party doctrines of various nationalist political parties will be analyzed. 
As noted in the methodology section, one aspect of the content analysis will include the 
examination of those nationalist parties in countries with somewhat equal levels of 
support regarding the independent variable. However, one of these countries will have  
low levels of the dependent variable while the other will have high levels of the 
dependent variable. For this aspect of the study, those nationalist party doctrines within 
the countries of the Netherlands and Finland will be examined. In the Netherlands, 19 
percent of those surveyed believed the EU played a negative role in energy supply while 
15 percent of those surveyed in Finland believed the EU played a negative role 
(Eurobarometer 71.1, 342). However, 8.1 percent of those surveyed in Finland feel the 
greatest attachment to a nationalist party on EU issues while only 2 percent of those 
surveyed in the Netherlands feel the greatest attachment to a nationalist party on EU 
issues (Eurobarometer 71.1, 679). Therefore, if the hypothesized relationship between the 
variables is correct, it is expected that those nationalist parties in Finland would advocate 
more strongly against EU energy policies. In addition, it is important to note that the 
2011GDP per capita(constant 2005 U.S. dollars is $38,926 in Finland and $41,366 in the 
Netherlands (World Bank, October 2013).  
 The nationalist party to be examined within the Netherlands will be the Partij 
voor de Vrijheid or the Party for Freedom. To analyze this party, the party doctrine as 
found on the website of the PVV will be analyzed. Given that the doctrine appears in 
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Dutch, the language was translated using Google Translate software. The party platform 
begins by noting that the Netherlands should leave the EU and "close bilateral (FTA) 
agreements with the EU" (Partij Voor 2010, 18). Furthermore, it reads, "The Freedom 
Party wants to stop things like... various sustainability grants such as solar panels and red 
diesel" (Partij Voor 2010, 19). In addition, the author writes, "Therefore the PVV 
chooses lower taxes and reduce the tax on energy" (Partij Voor 2010, 19). In addition, 
the author writes, "No more flight tax, CO2 taxes," and that the “energy sector should be 
put in Dutch hands" (Partij Voor 2010, 21). The author also notes that, "Nuclear energy 
remains, provided safely and responsibly," and "Never never ever European taxes" 
(Partij Voor 2010, 21). Finally, under the Environment section of the platform, it reads, 
"So no European rules that hamper growth" Furthermore, it says, "But who is better if 
nature is in danger: We or Brussels? Exactly!" (Partij Voor 2010, 51) Following an 
examination of the party platform, it does seem that the PVV does advocate rather 
strongly against EU energy policies. Though, the survey data suggests support for this 
nationalist party is low, it has become more powerful and recently became the third 
largest party in representation within the Netherlands (Dutch, 2013).  
 The party that will be analyzed in Finland is the Perussuomalaiset or the True 
Finns. As with the PVV, the party doctrine as found within the website of the True Finns 
will be examined and translated using Google Translate. The True Finns note that they do 
not want to "blindly follow the EU elite."(Persus S 2011, 34). In addition, "True Finns are 
opposed to the so-called green tax reform" (Persus S 2011, 44). Furthermore, it reads, 
"Many of the current government's peremptory tax and fee assessments, green energy 
	   55	  
tax... have increased the tangible household costs" (Persus S 2011, 47). It is important to 
note that these grievances seem more concerned with the current state level government 
as compared to the EU. The author writes, "the new government must change climate 
policy direction to ensure basic industry survival and growth opportunities in our 
country" (Persus S 2011, 48). Interestingly, the author writes, "Categorically quantified 
emissions targets would have to cut production, which therefore, should be transferred to 
countries that are not committed to similar goals and decisions as the EU" (Persus S 2011, 
48). Therefore it seems that the True Finns are favorable toward EU energy policies. 
However, the author does note, "The True Finns feel that Finland needs to diversify 
energy, which in the long be based on self-sufficiency (Persus S 2011, 51). There is a call 
to develop nuclear power within the party platform. In addition there is an emphasis on 
preserving rural ways of living and keeping energy costs low and equitable (Persus S 
2011, 52-70). The party doctrines of the two parties suggests that the PVV has more 
volatile rhetoric with regard to EU energy policies as compared to the True Finn party. 
However, it is worth mentioning that the PVV party has gained more popularity within 
the Netherlands and has become the third largest party (Dutch, 2013).  However, this 
cannot conclusively be linked to rhetoric against EU energy policy. It also does not seem 
that rhetoric against EU energy policies drives support for True Finns.  
Though parties in the Netherlands and Finland provide an interesting comparison, 
examining other parties can provide further insight. The Swedish Democrats are a 
nationalist party within Sweden. Though Sweden has higher levels of support for state 
level energy policies, they do not have much support for nationalist political parties. 
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However, this seems to be changing based on recent elections (BBC News). Though they 
have a similar GDP to Finland and reside in a similar geographic location, support for the 
nationalist party in Sweden is less than in Finland. The party platform of the Swedish 
Democrats reads, “It is important for a nation to control its own energy, but this does not 
exclude that the energy system can be shared and developed through collaboration 
between nations” (Sweden 2014, 1). In addition they note they are "opposed to a common 
European Electricity exchange" (Swedish, 2014, 3). Given that recent elections have 
shown a recent rise in support for the Sweden Democrats, it is possible that their stance 
against some EU energy controls may play a factor.   
The most significant results of the regressions occurred when Eastern European 
countries were isolated. These nationalist parties may have stronger rhetoric against EU 
energy policies. The party platform of Partija Tvarka ir teisingumas or the Order and 
Justice Party within Lithuania will be analyzed. The Order and Justice Party is the fourth 
largest party and lost four seats in the most recent election (Republic 2012). The author 
writes, "With the integration into the European Union structures, we must employ as 
much effectively as possible the existing Ignalina NPP resources and to remain the 
country producing and exporting the safe nuclear energy" (Order and Justice 2014, 6). 
Therefore, it seems that the nationalist party wants to ensure current nuclear development 
is sustained. However, the party actually seems somewhat favorable toward EU energy 
policy arrangements. The author writes, "The energy system should be necessarily 
restructured according to the European Union directive requirements" (Order and Justice  
2014, 6). Furthermore, the platform of the party reads, “the Lithuanian energy system 
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must be integrated into the Baltic and European energy networks" (Order and Justice 
2014, 6). Therefore, it does not seem that this nationalist party views EU energy policy as 
being unjust. Rather, there seems to be a desire to integrate within the system. However, 
there is a desire to maintain Lithuanian influence as evidenced by the authors claim that, 
“Lithuania shall become the important link of energy supply and transit" (6).   
 To provide further background regarding the attitudes of nationalist parties in 
Europe, the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, or Freedom Party of Austria will also be 
examined. The Freedom Party of Austria recently became the third largest party and 
gained six seats in a recent election (National Election 2013). The author writes, "We 
want to invest in domestic energy sources and not in the purchase of emission allowances 
in the so-called environmental support abroad" (FPO 2014, 55). In addition, the author 
notes that the, "Freedom Party rejects a global emission rights trade and the financing of 
so-called environmental support from abroad" (FPO, 2014, 56). Furthermore, there is a 
strong emphasis on "energy independence" to avoid dependency (FPO 2014, 58). The 
Freedom Party also classifies the European agricultural policy as "a failure" (FPO 2014, 
70). However, when discussing a reduction on VAT taxes related to energy, the Freedom 
Party notes that, "This measure would also correspond to the competition rules of the 
EU" (55). While both Austria and Lithuania certainly express skepticism toward the EU, 
there do not seem to be overt attacks against EU energy policies. It is important to note 
that the Freedom Party of Austria had stronger rhetoric against the EU energy policies as 
compared to the Order and Justice Party of Lithuania. Given that the Freedom Party of 
Austria has more support, it does provide some evidence for my hypothesis.  
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 To provide more analysis regarding the relationship between my variables, the 
Slovenska narodna strana or the Slovak National Party will be analyzed. The Slovak 
Nationalist Party is the sixth largest party in Slovakia and lost nine seats in a recent 
election (Elections to the Parliament 2014). The author writes that the party will work to, 
“ensure the population of indigenous renewable energy resources that would have been 
significantly less influenced by fluctuations in world markets” (Slovenska 2014, 7). In 
addition, the author notes that they, “do not share a view of the opposition that the 
salvation of Slovakia is seen only in an increasing utilization of foreign investment and 
repetition of selling off national assets” (Slovenska 2014, 8). Furthermore, the author 
believes the party should, “develop pressure to stand together with other new Member 
Sates calling for the removal of discrimination and equality subsidy conditions in EU 
countries (unequal subsidies in old and new EU member states” (Slovenska 2014, 12). In 
addition, the party platform encourages those in power to, “preserve the sovereignty of 
the Slovak territory, its territorial and political integrity, ensuring internal and external 
security of citizens” (Slovenska 2014, 29). There does seem to be an emphasis 
questioning those policies of the EU and ensuring Slovakia has access to its own 
resources.           
 Finally, the LNNK party of Latvia will be analyzed a party a party which gained 
six seats in a recent election. The author of the party platform writes, “The main task of 
the Latvian energy sector, we believe in ensuring the security of energy supply, as well as 
maximum Latvia -based renewable resources” (Tevzemei 2014). However, the author also 
notes that, “as soon as possible supplying gas market liberalization, which is now the 
	   59	  
Russian group ‘Gazprom’ and its Latvian subsidiary Latvian Gas “monopoly” (Tevzemei 
2014) Therefore, it seems that the LNNK is more concerned about Russian influence than 
EU influence regarding energy. Though the party expresses less caution for the EU than 
Russia, the author outlines a way to “meet EU Requirements” (Tevzemei 2014). In 
conclusion, it seems that the LNNK expresses more caution toward Russian energy 
monopolies than EU energy policies. However, it is important to note that the LNNK 
does not have as much support within Latvia as compared to the Slovak National Party in 
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Discussion 
 After review of party doctrines of various nationalist parties within Europe, the 
results are mixed. Though Finland had more support for nationalist political parties as 
evidenced by the Eurobarometer survey, the rhetoric of the nationalist party was more 
favorable toward the EU than that of the nationalist party within the Netherlands. Sweden 
showed evidence of less support for nationalist political parties in the Eurobarometer 
survey. Therefore, the lack of strong rhetoric against EU energy policies by the Swedish 
Democrats suggests that there is some evidence for my hypothesis. However, support for 
the Swedish Democrats has grown in recent years, which makes it more difficult to draw 
conclusions about the relationship of my hypothesis within Sweden (BBC News 2010) 
However, other countries, such as Lithuania, did not have strong rhetoric against the EU 
even though the statistical analysis portion of the study suggested the Order and Justice 
Party would take a stronger stance against EU energy policy. The rhetoric of the Austrian 
nationalist party is more wary of EU energy policies. Given Austria’s high levels of both 
the independent and dependent variables, it could be argued that there is evidence for my 
hypothesis. Furthermore, since the Freedom Party of Austria has achieved greater support 
in recent years, this could suggest a relationship similar to my hypothesis. The nationalist 
party within Slovakia also had stronger rhetoric against EU energy policies, and, given 
that Slovakia had high levels of both the independent and dependent variables, this also 
provides evidence for my hypothesis. Though the Latvian nationalist party expressed 
more angst toward the energy policies of Russia, a similar theme to my hypothesis could 
be detected which is the idea that a governing structure dictating energy policy can serve 
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as a source for nationalist party mobilization.      
 The data analysis portion of my study also provided mixed results. Though many 
of the statistical models provided insignificant results, many of these results did provide 
evidence for a positive correlation between variables, and some models even provided a 
statistically significant result as reported by Table 5, Model 6. Therefore, a strong 
argument could be made that a relationship between GDP, negative perceptions of energy 
policies, and support for nationalist political parties exists within the context of Eastern 
Europe. These relationships seemed weaker in the context of Western Europe. 
Furthermore, it does not seem that time of membership had much impact on the 
relationship between the variables. Together, the statistical analysis and content analysis 
provides evidence that a positive correlation between variables does exist within a variety 
of contexts and that these relationships are most prominent within Eastern Europe. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 The purpose of this independent study project was to explore the relationship  
between energy policies of the European Union and support for nationalist political 
parties. Literature pertaining to various types of nationalism was reviewed to construct a 
theory of how perceived unjust EU energy policies affect nationalist party support. I 
argued that perceived unjust EU energy policies contribute to the rise in support for 
nationalist political parties. To test this hypothesis, I utilized data found within 
Eurobarometer Survey 71.1 and 73.4 from a variety of questions that related to my two 
variables. In addition, I applied numerous control variables. According to regression 
analyses of the data, it was determined that while there was a positive correlation 
between my variables, there only existed a statistically significant relationship within the 
context of Eastern Europe. From a more general standpoint or for Europe as a whole, the 
null hypothesis could not be rejected. Through content analysis of the party doctrines of 
various nationalist political parties, my hypothesis was both supported and unsupported. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis could not be rejected.  
 Though my hypothesis was not supported, my findings remain interesting and 
contribute to a greater understanding of the causes of nationalism. Given that nearly all 
models showed positive correlation between my variables, it suggests that perceived 
unjust energy policies from an interstate body such as the EU may play some sort of role 
in encouraging nationalism. However, more research is necessary to fully understand this 
potential relationship.  
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 To potentially provide a more conclusive answer to my research question, the 
development of more individual level data is necessary. Though Eurobarometer questions 
and data were effective, my results were largely the product of aggregate data. Therefore, 
asking more direct questions, surveying more people, and having access to the responses 
of individuals, rather than groups, would further advance exploration into my hypothesis. 
Furthermore, without having direct access to people within various countries, it is more 
difficult to draw conclusions regarding their respective attitudes. Researchers may want 
to further investigate those countries within Eastern Europe to find more evidence to 
support my hypothesis. In addition, applying similar models of research to other regions 
of the world may provide further insights regarding a potential relationship between 
nationalist attitudes and energy policies.  
 Results of this study do have some practical applications for various state 
governments and those designers of interstate level policies. For example, given that 
there is some statistical significance between variables in poorer Eastern European 
countries, it does suggest that determining equitable policies should remain a priority of 
law-makers. The more general results of my study suggest that interstate energy policies 
may be beneficial and may not contribute directly to the rise of nationalist parties, 
suggesting that efforts to "green" current energy systems may not greatly disrupt state 
policies among those countries with more comparable GDP levels.  
 While results of this study have various implications, there may be flaws within 
my methodology that impacted results. I included various control variables to limit 
possible errors, but controlling for every aspect that may impact nationalist party support 
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is difficult. Various European countries all have different cultures and economies that 
GDP per capita may not be able to account for. Furthermore, the Eurobarometer survey 
questions were not perfect questions as they related to my independent variable. Given 
that a data set that directly asked about grievances against EU energy policies did not 
exist, I had to utilize questions that were directed toward energy supply or support for 
state level energy policies. Having more direct questions and more individual survey data 
may provide different results. In addition, given that not all questions relating to my 
variables were asked within the same data set, due to the fact that Eurobarometer Survey 
does not ask the same questions in each year, it resulted in the need to utilize different 
data sets of responses by different individuals. This may have contributed to a possible 
variance in results. Furthermore, given that the surveys only asked roughly 1500 people 
to respond within each country, the samples of the respondents may not have been 
representative of actual attitudes of the majority of citizens. Inexistence of perfect data 
may have resulted in imperfect results. Therefore, further investigation and research into 
determining attitudes of individuals regarding energy policy and utilizing methods that 
can result in a more direct data collection would be beneficial in further determining a 
relationship between energy policies and support for nationalist parties. My results 
suggest that there is likely no universal cause of nationalist party support. Rather, the 
context in which variables are applied seems to have great impact on discovering a 
statistically significant relationship.  
 In conclusion, my hypothesis that perceived unjust EU energy policies contribute 
to the support of nationalist political parties was not fully supported, but my results have 
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important implications for current and further research, as well as in applications for 
various policy makers interested in developing interstate energy agreements. The 
production and distribution of energy is critical in meeting the most basic needs of man: 
food, clothing, shelter. As the finite resources of energy dwindle, the laws of supply and 
demand will have consequences if technological advances cannot meet the demands. The 
emergence of nationalism as expressed through nationalist political parties seems if not 
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Appendix:  
Data Tables Data from Eurobarometer 71.1 and 73.4 and World Bank 2011 GDP per 
capita, Constant 2005 U.S. Dollars 
 
 
Table 6: Independent Variable: Percentage In Favor of State Level Decisions 
Regarding Energy Policy 
 
	   	  Percentage	  In	  Favor	  of	  State	  Level	  Decisions	  Regarding	  Energy	  Policy	  
Austria	   50.20	  
Belgium	   25.10	  
Bulgaria	   38.10	  
Cyprus	   17.00	  
Czech	  Republic	   39.70	  
Germany	   21.70	  
Denmark	   23.50	  
Estonia	   31.00	  
Spain	   34.00	  
Finland	   49.60	  
France	   26.30	  
Great	  Britain	   52.90	  
Northern	  
Ireland	   40.90	  
Greece	   37.30	  
Hungary	   26.70	  
Ireland	   33.30	  
Italy	   28.00	  
Lithuania	   22.20	  
Luxembourg	   24.60	  
Latvia	   21.60	  
Malta	   30.30	  
Netherlands	   29.60	  
Poland	   32.50	  
Portugal	   38.10	  
Romania	   44.00	  
Sweden	   41.00	  
Slovenia	   34.10	  
Slovakia	   32.90	  
 
Data from Eurobarometer 73.4  
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Table 7: Independent Variable: Percentage	  that	  Believe	  the	  EU	  plays	  a	  Negative	  Role	  
in	  Energy	  Supply 
	  
Percentage	  that	  Believe	  the	  EU	  plays	  a	  Negative	  Role	  in	  Energy	  
Supply	  
Austria	   28.80	  
Belgium	   20.50	  
Bulgaria	   43.00	  
Cyprus	   9.80	  
Czech	  Republic	   23.50	  
Germany	   25.80	  
Denmark	   10.00	  
Estonia	   12.40	  
Spain	   21.60	  
Finland	   14.50	  
France	   19.10	  
Great	  Britain	   40.90	  
Northern	  
Ireland	   32.70	  
Greece	   16.30	  
Hungary	   26.40	  
Ireland	   23.20	  
Italy	   28.30	  
Lithuania	   34.10	  
Luxembourg	   19.90	  
Latvia	   25.90	  
Malta	   19.30	  
Netherlands	   19.70	  
Poland	   21.60	  
Portugal	   23.40	  
Romania	   18.70	  
Sweden	   24.20	  
Slovenia	   17.60	  
Slovakia	   19.20	  
 
Data from Eurobarometer 73.4 
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Table 8: Dependent Variable Percentage	  that	  Feel	  Greatest	  Attachment	  to	  Nationalist	  
Party 
	  
	   Percentage	  that	  Feel	  Greatest	  Attachment	  to	  Nationalist	  Party	  
Austria	   17.50	  
Belgium	   4.90	  
Bulgaria	   6.00	  
Cyprus	   0.00	  
Czech	  Republic	   1.30	  
Germany	   2.30	  
Denmark	   10.50	  
Estonia	   1.20	  
Spain	   3.50	  
Finland	   9.10	  
France	   2.20	  
Great	  Britain	   6.50	  
Northern	  
Ireland	   29.10	  
Greece	   2.00	  
Hungary	   0.00	  
Ireland	   0.00	  
Italy	   8.30	  
Lithuania	   10.20	  
Luxembourg	   0.00	  
Latvia	   6.60	  
Malta	   48.40	  
Netherlands	   4.80	  
Poland	   2.20	  
Portugal	   0.70	  
Romania	   6.60	  
Sweden	   0.00	  
Slovenia	   7.00	  
Slovakia	   12.10	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Table 9: Dependent Variable: Percentage	  that	  Voted	  for	  Nationalist	  Party	  in	  the	  Last	  
Election 
 
	   Percentage	  that	  Voted	  for	  Nationalist	  Party	  in	  the	  Last	  Election	  
Austria	   16.9	  
Belgium	   7	  
Bulgaria	   13.8	  
Cyprus	   0	  
Czech	  Republic	   0.3	  
Germany	   1.8	  
Denmark	   9.3	  
Estonia	   0.4	  
Spain	   1.8	  
Finland	   7.1	  
France	   2.3	  
Great	  Britain	   4.8	  
Northern	  
Ireland	   29.2	  
Greece	   1.9	  
Hungary	   0	  
Ireland	   0	  
Italy	   8.3	  
Lithuania	   7.8	  
Luxembourg	   0	  
Latvia	   8.6	  
Malta	   49.4	  
Netherlands	   2.3	  
Poland	   0.8	  
Portugal	   0.3	  
Romania	   7.1	  
Sweden	   0	  
Slovenia	   5.7	  
Slovakia	   22.5	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   Percentage	  that	  Feel	  Closest	  to	  Nationalist	  Party	  on	  EU	  Issues	  
Austria	   16.9	  
Belgium	   7	  
Bulgaria	   13.8	  
Cyprus	   0	  
Czech	  Republic	   0.3	  
Germany	   1.8	  
Denmark	   9.3	  
Estonia	   0.4	  
Spain	   1.8	  
Finland	   7.1	  
France	   2.3	  
Great	  Britain	   4.8	  
Northern	  
Ireland	   29.2	  
Greece	   1.9	  
Hungary	   0	  
Ireland	   0	  
Italy	   8.3	  
Lithuania	   7.8	  
Luxembourg	   0	  
Latvia	   8.6	  
Malta	   49.4	  
Netherlands	   2.3	  
Poland	   0.8	  
Portugal	   0.3	  
Romania	   7.1	  
Sweden	   0	  
Slovenia	   5.7	  
Slovakia	   22.5	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capita	   Log	  GDP	  
Austria	   39,815.40	   10.59200905	  
Belgium	   36,941.20	   10.51708274	  
Bulgaria	   4,572.00	   8.427706025	  
Cyprus	   22,686.10	   10.02950768	  
Czech	  
Republic	   14,414.90	   9.576017673	  
Germany	   37,271	   10.52597082	  
Denmark	   46,699.20	   10.75148231	  
Estonia	   11,317.90	   9.334140822	  
Spain	   25,628.10	   10.15144468	  
Finland	   38,926.30	   10.56942539	  
France	   34,405.40	   10.44596881	  
Great	  
Britain	   38,032.40	   10.54619371	  
Greece	   19,809	   9.893891659	  
Hungary	   11,147.10	   9.318934653	  
Ireland	   45,866.90	   10.733499	  
Italy	   29,156.30	   10.28042629	  
Lithuania	   9,577.90	   9.16721364	  
Luxembourg	   80,914.90	   11.30115326	  
Latvia	   7,840.70	   8.967083395	  
Netherlands	   41,366.40	   10.63022424	  
Poland	   10,387.40	   9.248348812	  
Portugal	   18,385.80	   9.819333907	  
Romania	   5,406.00	   8.595264727	  
Sweden	   44,078.90	   10.69373649	  
Slovenia	   19,126.60	   9.858835315	  
Slovakia	   14,730.50	   9.597675453	  
	  
Data from World Bank 2011 GDP per capita, Constant 2005 U.S. Dollars	  
